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Abstract
This article attempts to disentangle the mire of European patent authority and provide some
picture of how the ultimate resolution of the proposed EC Directive will appear. Part I contains
introductory and background materials on the biotech industry and the importance of patent protection to the future proliferation of technological innovation. Part I exposes current issues in the
scientific and political realms of biotech patent law as well as the standard justifications for recognizing inventors rights, considerations that are presently shaping the debate in Europe. Part II
attempts to ground the reader in the fundamentals of biotechnology patent laws as developed in
the United States in order to provide a basic conceptual foundation for comparing and evaluating
the bodies of European law. This section begins by introducing the basic statutory terminology
before turning to a discussion of the landmark United States Supreme Court opinion in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, where the Court held that genetically altered living matter may be patented.8 The
remainder of the section traces the legal developments spawned by the Chakrabarty decision. Part
III begins with an introduction of the various bodies purporting to govern patent rights in Europe
and attempts to resolve the supremacy issues among them. Attention then shifts to the proposed
Council Directive on biotech patents: the procedures for its adoption, the political forces shaping
the debate of life patents in Europe, and the important proposals for amending the original draft.
Finally, this article will speculate on the ultimate resolution of the Draft Directive as a united
system of patent laws for the European Community Member States.
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INTRODUCTION
By early 1985, Europe's biotechnology industry found itself at a competitive disadvantage vis-'-vis its international rivals in a deficit that was fast approaching perilous dimensions.
Its predicament was attributable to the woefully deficient patent rights recognized by most European nations pertaining to
the protection of industrial property. For many of Europe's
biotechnology companies the solution was to relocate outside
the European Community ("EC") into countries that fostered
innovation with liberal patent laws.' Witnessing the premature
demise of its biotech industry, which had been heralded as the
technology and enterprise of the twenty-first century, the EC
was compelled to act.
Resolved to reaffirm its position in the emerging biotech
industry the Commission of the EC. (the "Commission") set to
work drafting a unified and compulsory convention on patent
1. Robin Whaite & Nigel Jones, BiotechnologicalPatents in Europe-The Draft Direc-

tive, II

EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.

145, 146 (1989) [hereinafter Whaite &Jones].
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laws. 2 On October 20, 1988 the Commission issued its proposal to the Council of Ministers (the "Council") for a Directive
on the Legal Protections of Biotechnologies (the "Draft Directive" or the "Directive").3 The Draft Directive mandated that,
upon its adoption, Member States of the EC should amend
their respective national laws to reflect the unifying proclamations of the Commission.4 Unanimous opinion embraces the
notion that common patent protections will substantially increase the value of biotech patents in the EC, thus attracting
more research capital to finance new generations of innovation.5 Furthermore, a unified patent system is increasingly important to EC companies and their ability to compete successfully with rivals in Japan and the United States, who benefit
from inclusive patent law protections. Despite these economic
necessities, the Draft Directive has become the captive of public debate regarding the highly controversial issue of patenting
living matter, which has raged in Europe for over five years.
To date, only four EC Member States have substantially complied with the terms of the Draft Directive.6 The remainder of
the Member States, embroiled in public debate, recognize only
the less inclusive patent protections proscribed by the European Patent Convention ("EPC").7 The EPC laws, however,
contain language that directly conflicts with the terms of the
2. See, Biotechnological Inventions: Proposal for a Council Directive on the
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, Oct. 20, 1988, Oj. C 10/3 (1989),
cited in, Leslie William Melville, FORMS AND AGREEMENTS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND INTERNATIONAL LICENSING 3-114 (Clark, Boardman Callaghan rev. ed. 1992)
[hereinafter, DRAFT DIRECTIVE].

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The preamble of the proposed directive makes repeated reference to the
importance of a unified patent system for protecting and promoting investment in
biotechnologies, referring to biotech as an industry "considered of fundamental importance for the Community's industrial development." Id.
6. David Buchan, The European Market: Biotech Groups Find Bright New World Slow to

Dawn, THE FIN. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at 2. As of the time of this article Denmark,
Germany, and the Netherlands have incorporated the terms of the draft directive into
their national laws. Id. The United Kingdom presently provides more inclusive patent protections than the EC directive and is wrestling with the implementation of the

directive. Id.
7. European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1979, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 5 (1976)

[hereinafter EPC]. The European Patent Convention was established in 1975 and
now consists of 18 member countries. Contracting nations include all EC Member
States in addition to Austria, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Sweden, Monaco and Egypt.
Id. Ireland was the latest addition completing ratification procedures in May of 1992.
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Draft Directive, further complicating the status of biotech patents.
This article attempts to disentangle the mire of European
patent authority and provide some picture of how the ultimate
resolution of the proposed EC Directive will appear. Part I
contains introductory and background materials on the biotech
industry and the importance of patent protection to the future
proliferation of technological innovation. Part I exposes current issues in the scientific and political realms of biotech patent law as well as the standard justifications for recognizing
inventors rights, considerations that are presently shaping the
debate in Europe.
Part II attempts to ground the reader in the fundamentals
of biotechnology patent laws as developed in the United States
in order to provide a basic conceptual foundation for comparing and evaluating the bodies of European law. This section
begins by introducing the basic statutory terminology before
turning to a discussion of the landmark United States Supreme
Court opinion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the Court held
that genetically altered living matter may be patented.8 The
remainder of the section traces the legal developments
spawned by the Chakrabarty decision.
Part III begins with an introduction of the various bodies
purporting to govern patent rights in Europe and attempts to
resolve the supremacy issues among them. Attention then
shifts to the proposed Council Directive on biotech patents:
the procedures for its adoption, the political forces shaping the
debate of life patents in Europe, and the important proposals
for amending the original draft. Finally, this article will speculate on the ultimate resolution of the Draft Directive as a
united system of patent laws for the European Community
Member States.
I. ISSUES IN THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY PA TENTS
In 1953 J.D. Watson and Francis Crick discovered the
double helical structure of the deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA")
& LYBRAND, EC COMMENTARIES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 85, § 15.2 (Nov.
26, 1992).
8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
COOPERS
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molecule revealing the genetic code of life. 9 The DNA molecule contains nature's blueprints, determining the hereditary
characteristics passed on from one generation of plant or
animal to its offspring. Watson and Crick's work touched off
an avalanche of genetic research seeking to unlock the secrets
hidden within the double helix.10 Their early work has since
given rise to the modem multi-billion dollar industry known as
biotechnology.
Modem biotechnologists continue to chart the frontiers of
the DNA molecule with ever-increasing expedience and precision. At present, recombinant DNA research has led to the
production of human growth hormones, human insulin, alpha
interferon, and a hepatitis B vaccine.I These products represent only a minute fraction of the medical advances scientists
expect to reap from genetic research in the near future. Experts believe that the cure to cancer, Alzheimer's, and other
hereditary illnesses will ultimately be found by isolating the afflicted genes and substituting them with normal genetic material. Many also foresee the AIDS virus, the most significant
medical threat of this century, being conquered through the
application of genetic research.
The "biotech dream" is being realized far beyond the laboratories of medical technicians. Application .of biotechnology
in agriculture has resulted in faster and more accurate methods of enhancing crop production than those formerly attained
through selective breeding techniques.12 By studying a plant's
genetic blueprints, researchers can isolate and alter the genetic
material that determines its specific characteristics. Therefore,
scientists can achieve in one generation with certainty what
might have otherwise required years or decades of specialized
breeding.
"Ag-biotech" crops promise higher yields of better tasting
produce, which can be grown with less water and in inferior
soil.' 3 Progress is also being made toward the development of
9. Edmund J. Sease, From Microbes, To Corn Seeds, To Oysters, To Mice: Patentability
of New Life Forms, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 551, 552 (1989) (citingJ.D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE

HELIX 108 (1968)) [hereinafter Sease].
10. Sease, 38 DRAKE L. REV. at 552.
11 Id. at 569.

12. Id.at 552.
13. Sease,. 38 DRAKE L. REV. at 568.,
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crops that are genetically resistant to disease and pests. Such
advances promise to reduce agriculture's susceptibility to
drought, and break its dependence on chemical pesticides and
fertilizers that pollute the environment and have uncertain effects on the consumer.' 4 In 1991 the "ag-biotech" industry
was estimated- to have generated $200 million in revenues.' 5
Industry analysts predict continued rapid growth as new prod6
ucts are introduced and more capital pours into research.'
In addition to the environmental benefits of reduced
chemical dependency in agriculture, recent biotech research
has developed microorganisms for application in environmental clean-up. The process is called "bio-remediation" and involves the production of microorganisms which consume environmentally harmful matter and degrade it into safe natural
byproducts.' 7 Experts anticipate such technology to be helpful
in the clean-up of oil spills, hazardous waste dump sites, and
other environmentally toxic disasters.
Not all, however, are pleased with the prospects of harnessing the power of the gene or manipulating the genetic sequences. Opponents to the proliferation of biotechnologies
"present a gruesome parade of horribles,"' drawing upon
haunting images of cloning "Frankensteins" or the release of
pathogenic microbes in an effort to raise public awareness.
Though opponents of proliferation rely on somewhat unrefined methods, their concerns are real and demand the attention of the public and lawmakers. Opposition originates
from three primary sources: (1) the agricultural community,
(2) environmentalists, and (3) the "ordre public" or morally
opposed. 19
As the biotech industry in the United States began to blossom in the early 1980s, commentators predicted that its most
14. Vice President's Council on Competitiveness, REPORT ON NA.TIONAL BioTECHNOLOGY POLICY 3 (Feb. 1991) [hereinafter "REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY").

15. Joan C. Hamilton et al., The Country Cousin is Blossoming, Too, Bus. WK., Mar.
2, 1992, at 72.
16. Joan C. Hamilton, Biotech: America's Dream Machine, Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 1992,
at 66.
17. REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra note 14, at 4.

18. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980).
19. See generally Al Gore, Federal Biotechnology Policy: The Perils of Progress and the
Risks of Uncertainty, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 965 (1987).
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difficult task would be clearing the hurdle of public opinion.
Then Senator from Tennessee Al Gore wrote, "the scientific
community must realize that public perceptions will set the
agenda for biotech regulation, research funding, and consumer support. "20 The American public, however, has been
conspicuously absent from the research process. Pragmatic
concerns regarding investment opportunities in biotech firms
appear to be of greater importance to the American public
than debating the moral implications of gene manipulation.
Unlike their American counterparts, the people of the
Member States of the EC have assumed a prominent role in
the establishment of regulatory policies in their respective nations. Europe has been engaged in a fierce five-year debate
pitting farmers and environmentalists against the biotech industry, each competing for public support. The prize is the
approval or rejection of the EC Directive pertaining to a unified system of legal protections for biotechnologies. As the
people of the EC undertake this protracted policy debate, however, the future viability of European biotech companies as
participants in the "biotech dream" is being threatened by
competition from their foreign rivals.
A. The Purpose of a Patent System
The origins of definitive patent law can be traced to the
lucrative silk trade of the Northern Italian City States during
the 15th century. In 1474 the Council of Venice enacted what
is generally regarded as the first patent statute, which granted
an exclusive ten-year privilege to the inventor of any machine
or process that expedited or improved silk making. 2 ' The statute assigned a special council to review applications and proagainst the infringement of any exvided for express remedies
22
grant.
privilege
clusive
Inspiration for the Venetian law was purely commercial. It
clearly demonstrates the Venetians' keen understanding of the
economic power of a monopoly, and an underlying knowledge
that humans are not purely altruistic beings. Adam Smith first
20. Id. at 972.
21. PETER D.

ed. 1993).
22. Id.

ROSENBERG,

1 PATENT

LAW FUNDAMENTALS,

§§ 1.08, 1-24.15 (rev.
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articulated these concepts in 1776, penning the following
thoughts regarding European trade expeditions: "It is the easiest and most natural way in which the state can recompense
of
them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment,
23
benefit."
the
reap
to
afterwards
is
public
which the
The motivations for modern patent laws have changed little over the centuries. Indeed, the preamble to the EC Council
Directive on biotech patents accepts "the fact that the function
of a patent is to reward the inventor with an exclusive but timebound right for his creative efforts and thereby encourage inventive activities. '"24 Without such state-enforced protections,
the inventing firm is denied the opportunity to recover its research & development ("R & D") costs by competitors receiving a free ride on the innovation. The free riders, who do not
need to recoup R & D expenses, can undercut the inventing
firm's price and deny it a fair return. Hence, in the absence of
adequate patent protection, a firm has less incentive to invest
in the development of new products and processes.2 5
Furthermore, without the recognition of exclusive rights
to invention, innovators will conceal their advancements under
veils of confidentiality in order to protect their investments.
Patent laws require full disclosure of the protected subject
matter, information that is freely available to the public. Without such protections, innovators will deliberately obstruct the
dissemination of socially desirable information resulting in duplicative and unnecessary research.2 6
The biotech industry is particularly sensitive to patent
concerns because of its inherent need for long-term cash commitments to finance protracted development cycles. For example, one U.S. biotech concern laid out $900,000 over several
years to develop a more durable and productive maize hybrid,
and $600,000 for a similar soybean variety.2 7 If countries fail
to protect such product development, biotech firms will have
23. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 712 (1976); ROSENBERG, supra note 21 §§ 1.07, 1-24.12.
24. DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, O.J. C 10/4 (1989).
25. Thomas M. Keane, The Patentability of Biotechnological Inventions, IR. LAW
TIMES at 139 (June 1992).
26. Id.
27. Whaite & Jones, supra note 1 at 146.
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little incentive to develop such beneficial products. When innovation does occur, it will be shrouded in secrecy.
The inherent value of the EC is the creation of a common
market, which enables EC producers to exploit economies of
scale by freely supplying goods and services to several nations,
as opposed to just one.2 8 As biotechnologies represent a valuable component of future world trade, a unitary system for patenting these technologies is crucial. 9 If the Member States of
the EC desire to participate in the promise of biotechnology,
they must ensure that their laws on the patentability of living
matter comport with those protections offered by their principal competitors in this new industry, the U.S. and Japan.
II. PATENTING LIVING MATTER IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Patentable Subject Matter Pre-Chakrabarty
Pursuant to the expansive powers granted it by Article 1,
§ 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, Congress has authored a
plethora of patent legislation. 0 The starting point of these
statutes is Title 35, § 101 of the United States Code, 3 ' which
states, "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title."'3 2 The term "new" is expanded upon in sections 102
and 103, which deny patents where the invention is "known or
used by others" (novelty) 33 or obvious to a person learned in
28. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5/79-II), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter "EEC
Treaty"]. Consistent with basic economic theory, the European Community articu-

lated the benefits of a common commercial policy in Article 110 of the EEC Treaty,
which states in pertinent part, "[t]he common commercial policy shall take into account the favorable effect which the abolition of customs duties between Member
States may have on the increase in the competitive strength of undertakings in those
States." Id. at art.' 110, 298 U.N.T.S. at 58.

29. See Whaite.& Jones supra note 1 at 154 (reprinting following portion of preamble of the Council Directive: "[w]hereas biotechnology and genetic engineering
are playing an increasingly important role in a broad range of industries and the
protection of biotechnological inventions can be considered of fundamental importance for the Community's industrial development")..
30. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
32. Id. (emphasis added).

33. 35 U.S.C § 102 (1988). "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless- (a)
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the art 34 Therefore, the three elements necessary to obtain a
patent grant: (1) novelty, (2) utility, and (3) non-obviousness.
The language that follows the new and useful elements in
section 101 defines the scope of patentable subject matter to
include any "process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter .... ,
Subsequent judicial doctrine has further refined this scope by identifying several classes of non-patentable inventions including: scientific principles, laws of nature,
3 6
physical phenomena, abstract ideas, and products of nature.
The exclusion of "products of nature" from patentable subject
matter is pertinent to the current debate over the patentability
of living matter.
1. The "Products of Nature" Doctrine
The "products of nature" doctrine is derived from the inherent truth that something cannot be "new" if it already exists in nature.3 7 Discovery of a previously unknown plant variety is certainly new by dictionary definition, however the novelty element demands that an inventive step be taken by the
applicant. The founder of the previously unknown plant cannot claim to have achieved any such step; therefore, the novelty requirement is lacking, which precludes patent protection.
The "products of nature" doctrine appears simple, yet
courts have struggled with its application. Their primary difficulty has been determining what degree of intervention constitutes an inventive step, which transforms the subject matter
from a product of nature into a patentable organism.3 8 A classic illustration of the "products of nature" doctrine is found in
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 39
The Funk Brothers case originated as a patent infringement
the invention was known or used by others .
Id. The remainder of the statute
contains definitions of knowledge and use. Id.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). "A patent may not be obtained... if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." Id.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
36. Elizabeth J. Hecht, Beyond Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: The Controversy
Over Transgenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1992).
37. Sease, supra note 9, at 554.

38. Id.
39. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948).
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action brought by the Kalo Inoculant Company against the
Funk Brothers Seed Company, alleging that Funk Brothers had
made unauthorized use of its patent of an inoculant for leguminous plants.4 ° The patented inoculant consisted of a combination of six bacteria strains that were each independently
known to act as inoculants in various leguminous plants.4
Prior to Kalo's discovery, however, combinations of inoculant
bacterium proved ineffective because they inhibited one another, a side effect that did not afflict Kalo's inoculant.42
The U.S. Supreme Court applied the "products of nature"
doctrine to reject Kalo's patent stating that, "[t]he combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the six
species of bacteria, and no enlargement of the range of their
utility." '4 3 In the Court's analysis, Kalo failed to demonstrate
that the combination of non-inhibiting bacteria amounted to
an inventive step. 4 Rather, the Court remarked of the mixed
bacteria inoculant, "[i]t is no more than the discovery of some
45
of the handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable.
Concurring in the Funk Brothers decision, but rejecting the
majority's application of the "products of nature" doctrine,
Justice Felix Frankfurter identified glaring problems with the
contemporary interpretation of the doctrine and suggested an
alternative reading. 46 Justice Frankfurter was concerned that
concepts like "the laws of nature" and "the work of nature'
were "vague and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation. ' 47 Extrapolating from that point,
40. Id. at 128-29. Leguminous plants are a unique species capable of removing
nitrogen from the air and fixing it in the plant for conversion into organic nitrogenous compounds which provide nourishment. Id. Examples of the species include:

clover, alfalfa, garden beans, garden peas and soy beans. Id. at 129. The bacteria
contained in Kalo's inoculant facilitate the nitrogen fixing ability of leguminous
plants, hence acting as a fertilizer. Id.
41. Id. at 129, n.3.
42. Id. at 130.
43. Id. at 131.
44. Id. at 131-32.
45. Id. at 131.
46. Id. at 132-35 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred in the decision not to enjoin the Funk Brothers from using an inoculant simi-

lar in nature to that developed by Kalo. Id. He based his determination on the fact
that the Funk Brothers' inoculant employed a different combination of bacterium
than that contained in the Kalo inoculant, hence not infringing upon their patent, but
rather utilizing the knowledge of the patent to develop a new product. Id. at 133.

47. Id. at 134.
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"[e]verything that happens may be deemed 'the work of nature,' and any patentable composite exemplifies in its properties 'the laws of nature.' Arguments drawn from such terms for
ascertaining patentability could fairly be employed to challenge almost every patent. ' 48 Justice Frankfurter realized that
the broad construction of these concepts would obstruct the
effectiveness of the patent laws and deny the deserved protections for persons engaged in research and development of living subject matter, because they could not establish the "novelty" (inventive step) element. To avert this potential, Frankfurter posed an alternative reading of the "products of nature"
doctrine that would recognize the "novelty" element where an
invention was derived from the application of the laws of nature and achieved a new and useful end.4 9
Justice Frankfurter demonstrated remarkable foresight in
identifying the inherent problems with the application of the
"products of nature" doctrine. Indeed, as he had predicted,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") used the
"products of nature" doctrine as its principal weapon to challenge almost every patent application that sought inventors'
rights in living matter. As a result of the Court's failure to
heed this distant early warning, U.S. patent law relating to living subject matter was condemned to over thirty years of confusion and uncertainty. 50
2. Plant Breeders' Rights
To escape the uncertainty within patent law, Congress enacted special legislation to recognize rights for plant breeders
who would not otherwise qualify for protections under the patent laws due to the existence of the "products of nature" doctrine. These protections are provided within a confluence of
the Plant Patent Act of 19301' and the Plant Variety Protection
Act of 1970.12 The first piece of legislation extended protections for breeders of new and distinct varieties of asexually reproducing plants. 53 The later Act extended the protections to
48. Id. at 135.
49. Id.
50. Sease, supra note 9, at 556-57.

51. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1988).
52. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321.2582 (1988).
53. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1988). Section 161 entitled "Patents for plants" states:
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new varieties of sexually reproduced plants, excepting fungi and
bacteria.5 4
These plant breeders protections are considerably narrower than the standard utility patent, granted pursuant to 35
U.S.C. § 101.
The primary reason is that the subject matter
qualifying for these protections is restricted to plant life that is
not a microorganism. 5 6 Hence, left unprotected are any inventions related to animals, humans, or the microorganismic
world in which biotechnology is most promising. A
subordinate concern with the plant breeders rights is that they
are undermined by several major exemptions, most notably

those permitting researchers and farmers to utilize the protected plants free of licensing fees. 57 As these are the two major groups with a use for new plant varieties, these exemptions
erode the substantial value of any exclusive rights in plants.
Legal protections available through the plant breeders
rights and the patent laws, complicated by the "products of nature" doctrine, were illusory at best. Consequently, early biotechnologists found little in the way of support for their innovative research. Due to the absence of adequate assurances to
protect individual inventions, the business community perceived biotechnology as an unattractive investment opportunity.
[w]hoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and
new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and
newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found
in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Id.
54. 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988). Specifically, § 2402 entitled "Right to plant variety
protection; plant varieties protectable" states in pertinent part that:
(a) The breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant (other
than fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the
variety, or his successor in interest, shall be entitled to plant variety protection therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this subchapter
unless one of the following bars exists.
Id.
55. See supra notes 31-35, and accompanying text (for a discussion of 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-103).
56. See 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988) (limiting protection to plants "other than fungi,
bacteria, or first generation hybrids").
57. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2543-2544 (1988) (stating that farmers exemption is created
in § 2543 and researchers exemption in § 2544).
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58
B. Patentability of Living Matter. Diamond v. Chakrabarty

Prior to 1980 the PTO and the federal court system en-

gaged in a seemingly determined effort to abjure the patentability of living matter. Despite the anomalous patent, such as

that issued to Louis Pasteur in 1873 for his purified culture of
yeast, 9 the courts invariably rejected patents that involved living subject matter. Their most effective weapon was the
"products of nature" doctrine, the success of which is illustrated in Funk Brothers.60 Where that doctrine failed, the PTO
and private plaintiffs reasoned that the two plant protection
acts of 1930 and 1970 demonstrated a Congressional intent
that the only living organisms to be afforded patent protections were those qualifying under one of the acts. 6 ' It would
inevitably require the Supreme Court of the United States to
embrace this issue and champion the biotech industry.
In 1980 the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion in what
58. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
59. Robert B. Kambic, Hindering the Progress of Science: The Use of the Patent System
to Regulate Research on Genetically Altered Animals, 16 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 441, 448
(1988).
60. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). A glaring example of the misapplication of the products of nature doctrine is presented in
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex, 283 U.S. 1 (1931), popularly known as the
"orange rind" case. Sease, supra note 9, at 556. The orange rind case originated as a
patent infringement suit brought by the Brogdex Company against American Fruit
Growers, Inc. (AFG). American FruitGrowers, 283 U.S. at 5. Brogdex alleged that AFG
had made unauthorized use of its patented process for impregnating the rind of oranges with borax, which rendered them resistant to blue mold decay. Id. at 6. AFG
responded by challenging the validity of the patent arguing that the orange was a
product of nature and retained that character despite the impregnation of borax. Id.
at 10. The patentee maintained that the combination of natural fruit and borax resulted in a distinct new orange not found in nature and therefore patentable. Id. at 8.
The Supreme Court disagreed with Brogdex and held the patent invalid, proclaiming that a product must "possess new and distinctive form, quality or property"
as evidenced by a "change in the name, appearance or general character of the fruit."
Id. at 11-12. This opinion has been widely criticized by commentators who contend
that (1) the borax did not naturally occur in orange rinds, thus adding a new quality
to the fruit, and (2) injecting the borax into the rind significantly changed the character of the fruit by making it resistant to the ruinous blue mold decay. See, Sease, supra
note 9 at 555.
61. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1979). In re Bergy was the companion case to Chakrabarty which held that a biologically pure culture of microorganisms
was patentable subject matter. Id. at 973. The PTO argument, urging that the Plant
Protection Act and Plant Variety Protection Act evidenced a Congressional intent to
remove plant life from coverage under the patent laws, was rejected by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. Id. at 979-80.
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is unequivocally heralded as the landmark case in biotechnologically related patent law, Diamond v. Chakrabarty.62 The case
was brought forth by a microbiologist challenging a ruling by
the PTO denying his application to patent a genetically engineered strain of bacteria capable of breaking down multiple
components of crude oil. Chakrabarty's invention was a process for introducing specific plasmids 63 capable of breaking
down four different oil components into a host Pseudomonas
bacteria. The unaltered, naturally occurring Pseudomonas had
no capacity for degrading the oil. 64 However, the modified
Pseudomonas was to have significant value for the treatment of
oil spills.
PTO examiners denied Chakrabarty's application based
on the dual analysis that: (1) micro-organisms are non-patentable "products of nature," and (2) as living things, they are per
se non-patentable subject matter. 65 The "products of nature"
argument was subsequently rejected by the Patent Office
Board of Appeals upon recognition that Pseudomonas possessing the special characteristics of Chakrabarty's bacterium
are not naturally occurring. 66 The Board, however, affirmed
the PTO ruling on the second argument, explaining that Congress's special provisions under the Plant Patent Act of 1930
constituted conclusive evidence that section 101 was not intended to cover living things.
The Supreme Court granted
review on the issue of "whether respondent's [Chakrabarty's]
micro-organism constitutes a 'manufacture' or 'composition of
matter' within the meaning of [35 U.S.C. § 101]."68
Step one of the Court's analysis required defining the concepts "manufacture" and "compositions of matter."6 9 The
62. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
63. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1096 (24th ed. 1982). A plasmid isan ex-

tra-chromosomal ring of DNA (hereditary material) that replicates autonomously in
bacteria. Id.
64. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
65. Id. at 306.
66. Id. at 306 n.3. Footnote four refers to In Re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 971, which
rejected the PTO's argument respecting the "products of nature" doctrine. The
Court stated that it agreed with the appellant that the claimed bacteria might not be
considered " 'products of nature,' because Pseudomonas bacteria containing two or
more different energy-generating plasmids are not naturally occurring." Id.
67. Id. at 306.
68. Id. at 307.
69. Id. at 308.
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term "manufacture" was defined according to its dictionary
definition, to mean "the production of articles for use from
raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new
forms, qualities, properties, or combination, whether by handlabor or by machinery. ' 70 A composition of matter was cited
in prior case law as including "all compositions of two or more
substances and ... all composite articles, whether they be the
results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or
whether they be gasses, fluids, powders or solids."'"
Step two involved the reading of these terms in their statutory context.7 2 The Court proclaimed that the combination of
such expansive terms as "manufacture" and "composition of
matter" modified by the all inclusive "any" was indicative of
Congress's intention that the patent laws be read broadly. The
Court also referred to Committee Reports from the 1952
recodification of the patent laws, 73 which stated Congress's intent that the statutory subject matter include "anything under the
sun that is made by man." 7 In conclusion, the Court held that
the language of section 101 fairly embraced Chakrabarty's invention of the Pseudomonas organism, thus dispelling the notion that living matter is not patentable.7 5
With this decision the Supreme Court opened a new world
of opportunity to U.S. industry. Many companies hesitated to
see if Congress would accept the Supreme Court's invitation to
enact regulations to cover the freshly exposed area of patents
on living matter. As the resulting legislative paralysis became
apparent, an excited rush into genetic research ensued.
Chakrabarty'sbroad interpretation of patentable subject matter
provided U.S. companies with the promise of patents to pro70. Id. Oddly enough, this definition was quoted from American Fruit Growers,
Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1,11 (1931). Certainly, the impregnation of the orange rind with borax, seems to have been given the fruit a "new quality or property"
due to Brogdex's inventive labor. Id.
71. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (citing to Shell Development Co. v. Watson,
149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C. 1957)).
72. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
73. See, S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952). In 1952 Congress recodified the patents laws, the
original language of which was written by Jefferson. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-376 (1988)
which forms the present U.S. patent law.
74. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; S.REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1952).
75. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-09.
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tect their investments. As the result, U.S. industry greatly expanded its commitment to genetic engineering, establishing an
early position of world dominance, which it has yet to yield.
C. Post-ChakrabartyDevelopments in the United States
The Chakrabarty opinion employed expansive language
that broadened the narrow reach of the patent laws to encompass living organisms as patentable subject matter allowable
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.6 Yet, despite the sweeping construction of this precedent-setting opinion, the future patentability
of living matter remained uncertain. It has required a dozen
years ofjudicial and legislative activity following Chakrabarty to
re-affirm that the comprehensive language, "anything under
the sun that is made by man," means in essence what it says.
To date the only express limit on the patentability of life is to
preclude any patent "claim directed to or including within its
scope a human being,"' 77 a narrow exclusion attributed to the
thirteenth amendment's prohibition of slavery. 78 The following section discusses the major judicial, legislative, and PTO
activity that has occurred since the Chakrabarty decision.
1. Ex parte Allen Decided April 3, 1987
Ex parte Allen 79 was brought before the PTO's Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences challenging the PTO examiner's denial of a patent for a method of inducing polyploiding
in Pacific oysters.8 0 The process involved the maintenance of
specific temperature controls during fertilization and incubation in addition to applying predetermined levels of hydrostatic pressure on the fertilized eggs. 8 This caused the formation of an additional set of chromosomes, which rendered the
oyster sterile and capable of growing much larger with a higher
meat content, due to the absence of reproductive activity.'.
76. Id.
77. 1077

OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 24, Apr. 21, 1987 [hereinafter PTO NOTICE].
78. See Kevin D. De Br6, Note, Patents on People and the U.S. Constitution: Creating
Slaves or Enslaving Science?, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 221 (1989). Commentators

suggest that the 13th Amendment's prohibition on slavery precludes the grant of an
exclusive property right (patent) in any matter directed to the human being. Id.
79. Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (1987).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1426.
82. Sease, supra note 9, at 563.
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The examiner supported its denial on the dual grounds of
unpatentable naturally occurring subject matter and obviousness. 83 The Patent Appeals Court eventually upheld the
PTO examiner's refusal to grant a patent on the grounds that
"prior art" (previous discoveries) disclosed the methods of
polyploiding other species of oysters, hence Allen's hydrostatic
process was obvious. 84 Despite this basis for rejecting the patent application, the court went out of its way to discuss
Chakrabarty, specifically noting that the polyploid oyster plainly
qualified as patentable subject matter.8 5
Although Allen was denied a patent because of the obviousness of his invention, this case is significant because for the
first time a court expressly provided that complex living organisms, beyond the microscopic world of bacteria, are not per
se excluded from patent protection. Hence, the Allen court's
broad construction of 35 U.S.C. § 101 venerated the comprehensive scope of patentable subject matter articulated in
Chakrabarty as including "anything under the sun that is made
by man. '"86
2. PTO Notice Announced April 7, 1987
Days after the Ex parte Allen opinion was announced, the
PTO issued a notice articulating a major policy shift at the examiner's office.8 7 The notice expressed the PTO's intent to
bring itself into full compliance with the Supreme Court's
Chakrabarty decision a laggardly seven years after it was handed
down. 88 Evidently, Allen admonished the PTO that the
Supreme Court, not the examiner's office, was responsible for
interpreting the laws of the United States.8 9
83. Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1426 (1987).
84. Id. at 1427.
85. Id. at 1426. ("The examiner has presented no evidence that the claimed polyploid oysters occur naturally without the intervention of man . . . [and as] nonnaturally occurring manufactures or compositions of matter are within the confines
of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.").
86. Id.; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
87. PTO NOTICE, supra note 77.

88. Id.
89. Id. The notice states in pertinent part:
The Board relied upon the opinion of the Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty . . . as controlling authority that Congress intended statutory
subject matter to 'include anything under the sun that is made by man.' The
Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally occurring non-
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Issue of this notice sent an unequivocal message to U.S.
industry that the PTO would relax its contentious stance toward biotechnological patents encompassing living matter.
This alleviated a great deal of the risk borne by biotech research firms and promised to expedite the patent process by
reducing the likelihood of legal challenge. One can only speculate as to the importance of this PTO notice to the biotech
boom of the late 1980s, although fundamental financial and
economic principles hold that lower risk attracts capital resources which lowers economic barriers to entry.
3. The Harvard Mouse Patent Issued April 12, 1988
Little more than one year after the heralded PTO notice
articulating the Office's new liberal policy toward the patentability of living matter, the United States Patent Office issued its
first patent on a multi-cellular living organism.9" The patented
subject matter was a mouse developed by researchers at
Harvard (the "Harvard Mouse" or "Mouse") which had been
genetically engineered to be highly susceptible to cancer. The
Mouse's ability to rapidly develop cancer made the animal a
more effective model for studying the contributions of genetics
to the development of cancer. 9 '
Though Chakrabarty and Ex parte Allen had cleared the way
for the patentability of complex organisms, the Harvard Mouse
was significant as the first actual granting of a patent on a living
mammal. Prior to this time the biotech industry had only
words as assurances that their scientific advancements would
be protected. The granting of a patent for the Harvard Mouse
demonstrated that the PTO would follow through with the intentions it had articulated in its Notice of April 7, 1987.
Equipped with an empirical example of a genetically engihuman multi-cellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable
subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. 101 ....
Accordingly, the Patent and Trademark Office is now examining claims directed to multi-cellular living organisms, including animals. To the extent
that the claimed subject matter is directed to non-human 'non-naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter - as product of human ingenuity,' such claims will not be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to nonstatutory subject matter.
Id.
90. U.S. Pat. No. 4,736,866, Apr. 12, 1988.
91. Sease, supra note 9, at 565.
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neered product on which the Patent Office had conferred patent recognition, the biotech industry attracted greater infusions of optimism and capital. 92 Hence, this relatively simple
organism represented a historical step in the evolution of biotechnology.
4. Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Acts of 1988 and 1989
The PTO notice and subsequent patent grant in the
Harvard Mouse enraged many animal rights activists and
raised economic concerns among farmers. Activist groups abhorred the idea of genetically engineering a living organism so
that it would be inherently susceptible to an agonizing disease
like cancer. Organizations of small farmers realized their inability to pay for the future of genetically superior animals and
crop strains that only the larger agri-business concerns could.
They feared extinction at the hands of corporate agriculture,
which could combine scale economies with biotechnology to
bury the smaller competition.
Such concerns prompted a number of attempts to enact
protective legislation at the expense of the biotech industry.
The first major effort was the Transgenic Patent Reform Act of
1988 (H.R. 4970). 9 3 Protections afforded by this proposed legislation focused exclusively on the agricultural industry providing a patent law exemption for farmers who would use the
technology only on the farm, thus not allowing any transfer or
sale of embryos, germ cells, or semen of a patented animal.9 4
This bill failed to pass in 1988 as did a nearly identical bill
before the 101st Congress in 1989. 9 5 No legislative efforts
have reached this stage since the failure of these two bills, nor
does the impetus appear in the House of Representatives to
support a third effort in the immediate future.
5. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg9 6 Decided April 30, 1991
The biotech industry was proceeding full steam ahead in
1991, unrestricted by the controls of public sentiment antici92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 566.
H.R. 4970, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1988).
Id.
H.R. 1556, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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pated by then Senator Al Gore. Indeed, the meager public opposition was falling on deaf ears. Rebuffed by their attempts at
arousing the public's concern regarding biotech research and
their legislative efforts to curtail life patents, the coalition of
environmental and animal rights activists sought relief in the
U.S. court system. The coalition realized its first opportunity
in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg.97 .
The plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund ("ALDF"), was
a national nonprofit corporation headquartered in San Rafael,
California, which works as an advocate for the interests and
welfare of animals. In pursuit of this objective ALDF filed suit
in 1988 challenging the PTO's authority in issuing the notice
of April 7, 1987 regarding the Patent Office's position that animals qualified as patentable subject matter.9 8 The ALDF petition sought an injunction compelling the PTO to cease issuing
patents for animals on the dual grounds that the PTO had (1)
violated procedural requirements for issuing such a notice by
skirting public notice and comment requirements, 99 and (2)
that patenting animals threatened the breach of a variety of
animal protection laws constituting a substantive violation.' 0 0
The case was summarily dismissed by the District Court,
which found the PTO notice to fall within a narrow exception
to the public notice and comment requirements.' 0 ' Although
the Circuit Court upheld the lower court's dismissal, it subsumed the grounds relied on by the District Court finding that
ALDF had suffered no legally cognizable injury and therefore
lacked standing to sue.' 0 2 Though finding a lack of standing
obviated the need for the court to discuss 35 U.S.C § 101, referring to patentable subject matter, the court reaffirmed the
liberal definition precipitating this case: "[t]he issue, in our
view, in determining whether the claimed subject matter is patentable under section 101 is simply whether that subject matter is made by man."'' 0 3 A patent grant on living matter will be
97. Id.
98. See PTO NOTICE supra note 77 (reprinting relevant text challenged in Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, supra note 98).
99. 5 U.S.C § 553 (b), (c) (1988).
100. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 923-24 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 922.
103. Id. at 928.
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granted provided there is human intervention in the development process such that the subject is not found in nature.
Thus, the courts denied ALDF a forum in which to discuss the
moral and ethical considerations of patenting living matter.
6. Dominance from Progressivism
The court in Animal Legal Defense Fund averted the controversy looming over animal patents, namely whether our society
has adequately considered the risks associated with manipulating the genetic make-up of complex animal life. Disregarding
the merits of the ALDF case, the-issues of morality encompassing biotech patents may best be resolved by a legislature
elected by the people rather than a court of judges who are
largely insulated from the popular electorate.1 0 4 Nevertheless,
opponents to animal patents have now lost in both the courts
and the legislative arena, clearing the way for the life patents
and proliferation of the biotech industry.
Beginning with Chakrabarty, the U.S. Judiciary has crafted
a pro-business policy, continually reaffirming its position that
the patent laws include anything under the sun that is made by
man. Concurrently, Congress has remained content for 13
years to accept sub silentio the courts' expansive definition of
the scope of patentable subject matter. The liberal policies toward patenting living matter in the United States are the most
progressive in the world and provide the mostexpansive protections available. Hence, it comes with little surprise that the
United States is presently the world's land of opportunity for
realization of the biotechnology dream, leading the world in
biotechnological innovations.
III. PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECHNOLOGIES IN EUROPE
A. Sources of European Patent Law
Europe presently has two sources of law that purport to
govern patent grants and a third being drafted, including (1)
104. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 322 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact this argument was made by Justice Brennan in his dissent to the
Chakrabarty opinion, although Brennan urged the court to narrowly interpret the
patent laws to exclude the patentability of living matter absent the express intention
of the Congress. Id. "It is the role of the Congress, not this Court, to broaden or
narrow the reach of the patent laws." Id.
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the agreements of the European Patent Convention ("EPC"),
(2) the national laws of the individual European states, and (3)
the Draft Directive of the European Community. 0 5 The confluence of these three sources of patent laws are vitiating the
property rights of biotech interests. In no area do the laws
threaten to so diverge and complicate matters as in the area of
life patents. This section discusses the various sources of patent law and further attempts to resolve potential supremacy
issues among the governing entities.
1. European Patent Convention
The European Patent Convention ("EPC") is presently
comprised of eighteen nations, including all the Member
States of the European Community plus Austria, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Sweden, Switzerland and Egypt.' 0 6 It was conceived in 1973 when the original eleven member nations
jointly adopted the basic principles of the Strasbourg' 0 7 and
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants ("UPOV") l°8 Conventions agreeing to establish a unified system for patent registration. The EPC's principal purpose was to enable a patent applicant seeking patent rights in
more than one country to achieve this result with a single application to a central authority.' 0 9 By empowering a central
body to issue and register patents pursuant to standardized
conventions, the EPC abates the costly and burdensome process of obtaining patents on an individual basis in each of the
105. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text (discussing Draft Directive).
106. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 7.
107. Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Invention, Nov. 27, 1963, Eur. T.S. No. 47 [hereinafter THE STRASBOURG
CONVENTION]. The Strasbourg Convention of 1963 laid down the commonly accepted principals upon which the EPC would be created. Id.
108. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
Dec. 2, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89, T.I.A.S. No. 10199 [hereinafter
UPOV]. UPOV is an international convention conceived for the protection of new

plant varieties and ensuring plant breeders a fair return on their investments. Id. at
2708. UPOV presently has 21 signatory nations committed to unifying their respective laws concerning plant patents. Id. In 1991, UPOV underwent substantial revi-

sion to address the developments in biotechnological sciences and their impact on
the generation of new plant varieties, although, the deadline for incorporating these
changes is not until 1995. See "Patenting Life; Intellectual Property Rights in Plants",
BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, May 8, 1992.
109. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 7.
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signatory nations. This cost-effective and time-efficient patent
system facilitates both investment and innovation.
The EPC issues a "European patent" vesting the holder
with a bundle of national patents representing the exclusive
rights to that invention in each of the contracting countries.
The rights and protections of a European patent are commensurate with those afforded a national patent granted by the individual country. Therefore, issuance of a European patent instantaneously creates a collection of national patents governed
by the independent laws of the various contracting states. This
is consistent with the governing principal of the EPC that it
may not replace or supersede the national patent system already in effect in the contracting states." °
The EPC is a registration system, not a legislative body.
Once the European patent is granted its enforceability is determined by the courts and parliaments of 18 independent member countries."'l A single European patent may be interpreted
and modified within the various contracting countries to represent 18 varying degrees of patent protections." 2 Therefore,
the impact of the EPC is limited to facilitating registration of
patents but accomplishes nothing toward the unification of
property rights, which is the most valuable element of a patent
convention.
a. Patentable Subject Matter Under the Articles of the EPC
The scope of patentable subject matter is set forth in EPC
Articles 52 and 53.' 1' Paragraph one of Article 52 provides
that a European patent shall be granted for "any invention
which is susceptible of indwtrial application, which are new and
1
The elements listed above
which involve an inventive step.""'
are parallel to the "utility, novelty and non-obviousness" factors necessary for a patent in the United States."-' Hence, patent fundamentals in the EPC are essentially the same as those
applicable in the United States.
110. ROSENBERG, supra note 21, at 19-61.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See ROSENBERG, supra note 21 at 19-63 (reproducing Articles 52 & 53 of
Community Patent Convention in full).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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EPC Article 53, entitled "Exceptions to Patentability," asserts that a patent shall not be granted where the subject matter of the patent is (1) "contrary to 'ordre public' or morality"
or (2) "plant or animal varieties or essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals.""' 6 The
patent laws of the United States likewise deny property rights
in plant and animal, varieties and basic biological processes,' 17
however the concept of "ordre public" is unique to the EPC.
"Ordre public" provides an opportunity for concerned citizens to challenge a pending EPC patent either before it is issued or any time after its issue. Were such an exception to
exist in U.S. patent laws it could empower such groups as the
Animal Legal Defense Fund"" with automatic standing to challenge patent grants that people might find morally offensive.
Therefore, citizens of the EPC possess the power to shape the
regulatory agenda respecting biotechnologies through the judicial process, unlike their American counterparts confined to
the agonizingly slow bureaucracy of its legislature. This additional power of the people has the unfortunate impact of increased risks and costs to the biotech researcher due to potentially lengthy time delays.
b. The Harvard Mouse's Trek through the EPC
The same Harvard Mouse that became the first patent
granted for a new variety of animal in the United States has
also made an appearance in Europe, seeking patent approval
from the EPC. This scenario is a valuable illustration of the
effectiveness of the "ordre public" as a weapon for the con116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127
(1948). Inherent in the element of "novelty" is a ban on patenting plant or animal
varieties, for something cannot be "new" if it already exists naturally. Id. at 130.
The Supreme Court denied a patent for the combination of several bacteria strains
capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous plants. Id. at 132. The Court reasoned that because the combination of bacteria strains did not change the characteristics of the individual bacteria the patentee had done little more than discover the
handiwork of nature. Id. at 131.
118. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(denying ALDF standing to challenge PTO Notice of April 7, 1987 pertaining to
PTO's intent to recognize patentability of animals). Standing was denied in this case
because ALDF did not comport with the technical requirements of showing an "injury in fact." Id.
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cerned citizen and the correspondingly negative impact on biotech producers.
In 1990, European biotech concerns won a significant victory when the EPC Technical Board of Appeals held in In re
Harvard that the EPC does not exclude the patenting of animals as a per se category." '9 The Board interpreted the Article
53 exception, which purports to exclude plant or animal varieties from patentability, to exclude only existing varieties, not
new and distinct plants or animals. engineered by biotechnology.' 20 With this decision, the EPC Board expanded the scope
of patentable subject matter, moving in the direction of the
United States, which in Chakrabartyfirst recognized the right to
patent animal life.
The EPC Technical Board of Appeals, however, stopped
short of granting a patent by remanding the case for further
inquiry on the issue of whether the exploitation of the invention would be contrary to "ordre public."' 12 1 On remand the
EPO ruled that the usefulness of the invention to humanity
outweighed the suffering caused to the animal. Despite its definitive statement, the EPO provided for a period of public
comment, allowing those opposed to the Harvard Mouse patent to bring their objections before the EPO prior to February
12, 1993.122 This has touched off a fierce effort by animal welfare activists, the Greens, 12 3 who fear that the Harvard Mouse
patent will provide massive financial incentive to find new ways
of exploiting animals and promote unnatural and inhuman
treatment of them. Though the fate of the Harvard Mouse patent appears a relative certainty at this point, the Greens have
vowed to continue their campaign with renewed vigor. They
have planned new offensives on a variety of fronts, including
119. In re Harvard, 5 Eur. Pat. Off. Rep. 501 (Tech Bd. App. 1990).
120. Id. at 510.
121. Id.
122. Biotechnology: Debate on Ethical Issues Flares Up Anew, EUR. ENV'T, Jan. 19,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
123. "Rio Ambush for EC Patents," BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, June 19, 1992, avail-

able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI file. The term "Greens" is used to define the
coalition of peoples who possess a heightened consciousness towards the human
condition, environmental pollution and animal welfare. It is derived from the name
of the political organization, the Green Party, through which the voices of these various interests converge. Id.
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(1) new appeals to the EPC Board of Appeals, 24 (2) challenging the Harvard Mouse patent in the independent courts of
each of the EPC nations, and (3) using the current controversy
as a bully pulpit to shape the pending European Community
patent directive in such a manner that it will compel an overhaul of the EPC or otherwise emasculate its power. Regardless
of the success or failure of the Greens' cause, it will dramatically increase the costs of patenting the Harvard Mouse and
undoubtedly discourage future biotech innovations that
threaten to provoke the same vehement opposition.
2. Patent Laws of the Various EC Nations
As discussed above, the EPC is exclusively a patent registration system, therefore the degree of protection afforded the
inventor depends entirely upon the patent laws of the independent nations. Though a discussion of the patent laws of
each of the Member States of the EC is beyond the scope of
this discussion, it is sufficient to understand that the patent
laws of the various countries cover a spectrum in degrees of
protection afforded to biotechnological innovations. This lack
of uniformity is precisely the weakness that groups such as the
Greens will exploit. The expense of litigating the validity of a
patent in 18 different countries, each with distinct patent laws,
is almost preclusive, rendering the Harvard Mouse patent
seemingly valueless.
Such an outcome is a virtual certainty in Europe, where
only three nations presently have patent laws that expressly
permit the patentability of living matter. Far and away the
most progressive countries are Germany and the United Kingdom with patent laws respecting biotechnologies that parallel
those of the United States and Japan. This comes as little surprise because Germany and the U.K. have been the most committed to the industrial development of biotechnologies.
The United Kingdom was early to adopt a liberal policy
toward the patentability of living subject matter. In 1976, the
124. Biotechnology: Debate on Ethical Issues Flares Up Anew, EUR. ENV'T, Jan. 19,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. Presently, opponents to the
Harvard mouse patent plan to dispute the issue of industrial application of the genetically engineered mouse. Id. Their claims cling to the concerns of some scientists
that the mouse developed by Harvard researches is not a useful model for identifying
cancer causing substances or developing anti-cancer drugs for use to humans. Id.
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U.K. Court of Appeals upheld a patent for the production of
tetracycline, finding that the cultivation of mutant strains was a
manner of new manufacture.125 By finding a manner of new
manufacture, the U.K.'s courts obviated discussion of the
"products of nature" doctrine that so perplexed the American
judiciary.' 2 6 Germany likewise exhibited an early liberal stance
toward the patentability of living matter. In the famous case of
Baker's Yeast, 12 7 decided in 1975 (five years before Chakrabarty),
Germany's Federal Supreme Court held that micro-biological
processes are not per se unpatentable solely because they
made use of living organisms.' 2 8 However, despite the liberal
policies of the few, the conservative positions on the patentability of living matter taken by the many prevent a unified European treatment, which is critical to Europe's ability to compete in the biotech industry of the twenty-first century.
3. European Community-The Draft Directive
The EPC made substantial strides toward a unified system
of European patent laws, yet it was conceived with several
tragic flaws that prevent it from significantly benefiting Europe's blossoming biotech industry. The EPC's most prominent defect is its lack of power to enforce unified treatment of
patents. Subscribers to the EPC vested the EPC with the authority to grant patents inclusive of all states, however they reserved the independent power to reject such patents if found
contrary to the laws of the individual State. 129 The product is a
unifying agreement inherently susceptible to disunity. This
defect is most clearly pronounced in the controversial realm of
biotech patents.
Recognizing the failures of the EPC, the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WiPO"), 130 and other interna125. American Cyanamid v. Berk Pharmaceuticals, 1976 R.P.C. 231 (1976).
126. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text (discussing Funk Bros.).
127. Baker's Yeast Decision, 1975 GRUR 430 (BGH 1975), reprinted in 6 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 207-19 (1975).

128. Id.
129. ROSENBERG, supra note 23, at 19-61.
130. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization,
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter WIPO]. WIPO is a specialized agency of the United Nations, having been formally established under a convention dated July 14, 1967. Id. Its primary function is to administer the Patent
Cooperation Treaty which is committed to harmonization of world patent laws.
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tional organizations to consummate a harmonious treatment of
biotech patent laws, the EC commissioned its own organization, the Community Patent. Convention ("CPC"). The CPC
soon proved as ineffective as its predecessors, and largely for
the similar'reason that it lacked authority to compel compliance. Frustrated by the impotence of unifying treaties and realizing that time was increasingly of the essence, the European
Community took the initiative.
The European Council, an independent body composed
of the heads of-state of the Member States, which had begun
work on biotechnology issues as early as 1985, originated the
Draft Directive.' 3 ' Their product, "Biotechnological Inventions: Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection
of Biotechnological Inventions," was submitted to the European. Council. on October 20, 1988. 12
a. Patentability ofLiving Matter Under the Draft Directive
Chapter 1 of the proposed Directive, entitled "Patentability of Living Matter," is composed of nine brief articles that
address the proposed subject matter that could qualify for patent protection. Because this is the critical component of the
Draft Directive, the most relevant portions, comprising Articles 2, 3,4, and 5, are reproduced here, followed by a brief
commentary.
ARTICLE

2

-

A subject matter of an invention shall not be

considered unpatentable for the reason that it is composed of living matter.
This simple proposition establishes that the subject of living matter is not to be preclusive of patentability. Article 2
recognizes an immense scope of patentable subject matter,
1 33
which the succeeding articles clarify and refine.
ARTICLE 3 1. Micro-organisms, biological classifications other than plant or animal varieties as well as parts
However, similar to the EPC, WIPO possesses no enforcement powers to compel
conformity. Every Member State of the EC is independently a member of WIPO.
COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 7.
131. DlRF DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, OJ. C 10/3 (1989);
The Single European
Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987) art. 2, (amending the EEC Treaty, supra note 28, and defin-

ing European Council, which is separate body from the Council of Ministers).
132. DRAFT. DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, O.J. C 10/3 (1989).
133. DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, art. 2, O.J. C 10/4 (1989).
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of plant and animal varieties other than propagating material thereof of the kind protectable under plant variety
protection law shall be considered patentable subject matter.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, plants
and plant material shall be considered patentable subject
matter unless such material is produced by the non-patentable use of a previously known biotechnological process.
Article 3 recognizes that micro-organisms, such as the oil
connoisseur patented in Chakrabarty and certain biological
classifications, may be patented. 3 4 It simultaneously carves
out two sizable exceptions from the broad proposition articulated in the previous article: (1) plant and animal varieties, and
(2) material produced by previously known processes..
Subparagraph 1 eliminates plant and animal varieties and
propagating material of those plants and animal varieties as a
per se non-patentable. class. 35 This exception parallels the
treatment accorded in the United -States, which prohibits such
patents under the "products of nature" doctrine. Therefore,
EC courts will also be confronted with the definitional difficulties regarding the products of nature that Justice Frankfurter
discussed in Funk Brothers.' 3 6

Recall Justice Frankfurter's

prophesy that the malleable terms "the work of nature" and
"the laws of nature.. .could fairly be employed to challenge
almost every patent." 137
It is common opinion that subparagraph 1 would permit a
utility patent to be granted for a plant or animal that exhibits
qualities distinct from the original variety. 3 This would extend the protections of the utility patent to plant and animal
varieties that might have otherwise qualified for the guardianship of UPOV i39 plant patent laws, though the directive is in
no way intended to interfere with the system of breeders'
supra note 2, art. 3, OJ. C 10/4 (1989).
supra note 2, art. 3(1), O.J. C 10/4 (1989).
136. Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
137. Id. at 135.
138. See UPOV, supra note 108, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89.
139. Id. UPOV protections were amended in 1991 to reflect developments in
biotechnology and will not be practically enforceable until 1995. Id.
134. DRAFT

DIRECTIVE,

135. DRAFTr

DIRECTIVE,

1020 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:990
rights.' 4 ° Such protections are concurrent to those offered by
the United States which, in the case of Exparte Hibbard, granted
a utility patent for a strand of corn plant developed to contain
abnormally high amino acid levels.' 4 ' The benefit of the utility
patent is that in both cases, under U.S. laws and the Draft Directive, patent protections are significantly broader than those
available under the respective plant protection laws, the U.S.
Plant Patent Act or UPOV. 4 2
Article 3, subparagraph two expressly excludes from patentability material that is produced by previously known
processes. This exception is redundant with the requirement
that the subject matter of a patent possess an "inventive step"
or otherwise be "non-obvious."' 143 The previously discussed
U.S. case In re Allen provides an ideal illustration of this point.
In Allen a researcher sought to patent a process for creating an
infertile Pacific oyster which involved the application of hydrostatic pressure in a carefully controlled environment. A patent
was denied because the court found it to be common knowledge that variations of Allen's processes had produced infertility in other varieties of oysters.14 4 Hence, Allen's discoveries
were an "obvious" extension of prior work which involved no
"inventive step."
The recognition of patents on new processes used to arrive at an invention comports with U.S. law which provides in
35 U.S.C § 101, "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
.... 994' Of significance is that Article 4 creates the opportunity to obtain a patent on the process of arriving at a plant or
animal variety, which standing alone are precluded from pat140. Whaite & Jones, supra note 1, at 148-49.
141. Ex Parte Hibbard, 227 U.S. PAT. Q. 2d 443, 446 (1985).
142. Sease, supra note 9, at 149.
143. See 35 U.S.C § 103 (1988) entitled "Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter." 35 U.S.C. § 103 states in pertinent part that "[a] patent may not
be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains." Id.
144. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S. Pat. Q. 2d 1425, 1428 (1987).
145. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), entitled "Inventions patentable" states in full text,
"[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id.
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entability under Article 3(1).146 As an example, "The insertion
of a particular segment of DNA into the genome of a seed will
new
still be patentable subject matter, even if the resulting
1 47
plant constitutes a variety and is not itself patentable."
Chapter 1 of the EC Draft Directive announces a scope of
biotech patent protections on level with those recognized in
the U.S. and Japan. 148 The significance is expressed by its
drafters in the Directive's preamble, "Whereas biotechnology
and genetic engineering are playing an increasingly important
role in a broad range of industries and the protection of biotechnological inventions can be considered of fundamental
14 9
importance for the community's industrial development."'
If accepted, the Directive will enable biotech concerns doing
business in the European Community to better compete in the
global market. New EC protections should recapture lost R &
D investment that formerly sought out the more advantageous
patent laws in the U.S. andJapan.15 0 In sum, ratification of the
Draft Directive should achieve the critical goals stated in the
Directive's preamble.
b. Resolving Conflicts Between the EPC and the
Draft Directive
The intent of authoring the Draft Directive was to create a
unified system for recognizing patents on living matter, which
the EPC failed to accomplish. The scope of patentable material and the protections afforded by the EC patent far exceed
the benefits offered by the EPC patent. Therefore, the clear
intent of the EC in proposing a directive was to supersede all
existing conventions purporting to govern biotech patent
rights. Hence, if ratified, the Draft Directive will reign
146. DRAvr DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, arts 4-5, O.J. C 10/5 (1989) states:
ARTICLE 4 - Uses of plant or animal varieties and processes for the production thereof shall be considered patentable subject matter.
ARTICLE 5 - Microbiological processes shall be considered patentable subject matter, [i.e.]... a process (or processes) carried out with the use of or
performed upon or resulting in a micro-organism.
Id.

147. Whaite & Jones, supra note 1, at 149.
148. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 7, § 11.2; see also DRAFT DIRECTIVE, supra
note 2, O.J. C 10/4-5 (1989).
149. Whaite &Jones, supra note 1, at 152.
150. Id. at 145.
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supreme with respect to Member States of the EC, though the
EPC will retain a subordinated role for the four non-EC members party to that convention: Austria, Liechtenstein, Switzerland and Sweden. 5 '

The Draft Directive asserts supremacy vis-A-vis the national patent laws of the individual contracting states. 52 Unlike the EPC, the Draft Directive is backed by the enforcement
powers of the European Community and can coerce legislative
action in any Member State by threat of sanctions. Indeed, Article 1 of the pending Directive proclaims that "Member States
shall ensure that their national patent laws comply with the
provisions of this directive."15 3 The enforcement power of the
EC will forge success where the other conventions, lacking
such authority, failed.
c. Ratification of the Draft Directive
The original text of the Draft Directive was submitted by
the European Commission15 4 to the Council' 5 5 on October 20,
1988. From this point the proposed Directive must be af151. ROSENBERG, supra note 21, at 19-61.
152. See supra notes 106-118 and accompanying text (discussing EPC). That
convention did not replace or supersede the national patent systems in effect in the
contracting states, consequentially, the contracting nations may limit the effectiveness of the EPC as applicable in their jurisdictions. EPC, supra note 7, 15 I.L.M. 5
(1976).
153. See DRAFTr DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, art. 1, OJ. C 10/4 (1989).
154. See EEC Treaty, supra note 28, arts. 155-63, 298 U.N.T.S. at 71-73. The
European Commission is a special 17 member board established in Title VI, section
3, articles 155-163. See EEC Treaty, supra note 28, arts. 155-63, 298 U.N.T.S. at 7173. The Commission is empowered to "formulate recommendations" for delivery to
the European Parliament where "the Commission considers it necessary." EEC
Treatysupra note 28, art. 155, 298 U.N.T.S. at 71. In this instance the Commission
recognized the problem of insufficient legal protections for biotech innovations and
responded with the draft directive on biotechnology patents. See DRAFT DIRECTIVE,
supra note 2, art. 1, O.J. C 10/4 (1989). The Draft Directive then proceeds to the
European Parliament which decides whether to adopt the directive. EEC Treaty,
supra note 28, art. 149, 298 U.N.T.S. at 70. Therefore, the Commission is prone to
be nepotistic toward the directive on biotech patents to which it gave rise. "Debate
on Biotechnology Ethical Issues Flares Up Anew," EUROPEAN INSIGHT, Jan. 15, 1993,

available in LEXIS, NEXIS library, CURRENT File.
155. The Council of Ministers is a body of delegates from the Member States,
each state represented by a Single Minister. EEC Treaty, supra note 28, art. 146, 298
U.N.T.S. at 70. The Council is the final word on EC legislation, though it must enact
such legislation pursuant to strict rules allowing for substantial input from the European Parliament. EEC Treaty, supra note 28, art. 149, 298 U.N.T.S. at 70.
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firmed by the Council and adopted as its "common position. 1 6 Next, the Council is compelled to consult the European Parliament,' 5 7 which may .pursue one of four paths: (1)
take no action, (2) approve by simple majority, (3) reject the
common position, or (4) propose amendments and return to
58
the Commission.
In the case of the Draft Directive on biotech patents the
European Parliament elected to propose numerous amendments, returning it tothe Commission for reconsideration. At
this stage the Commission may adopt or reject the proposed
amendments. If it chooses to reject the Parliament's suggestions, the Directive proceeds to the Council and may be
59
adopted only by unanimous vote--a virtual impossibility.
Alternatively, if the Commission elects to adopt the proposed
amendments, then ratification may be concluded upon a qualified majority vote of the Council.' 6° In this instance the Commission, reluctant to submit to all the requested amendments
proposed by the Parliament, has elected to seek a compromise
with the Parliament. The ensuing negotiation has evolved into
a protracted and highly public debate and resulted in the repeated postponement of the deadline contained in the original
text of the Draft Directive.
Opposition members within the European Parliament believed that greater protections were needed to protect farmers
61
and animal rights, and ensure a strict code of "bio-ethics.'
Opponents have employed scare tactics to rally popular opinion against the Draft Directive, confronting the public with the
gruesome parade of horribles in an effort to raise public aware156. Id. The Council votes are weighted in proportion to national economic
prowess according to a predetermined formula; adoption of a common position requires a qualified majority, which is 54 of the possible 76 votes. EEC Treaty, supra
note 28, art. 148, 298 U.N.T.S. at .70. Note that the United Kingdom and Germany
control 20 of these weighted votes. Id.
157. See EEC Treaty, supra note 28, art. 149, 298 U.N.T.S. at 70 (describing
voting procedure). The European Parliament is composed of representatives elected
directly by the Member States. See EEC Treaty, supra note 28, arts. 137-44, 298
U.N.T.S. at 67-69.
158. T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY Lw 304 (2d
ed. 1991).
159. Id. at 34-5.
160. Id.
161. "Debate on Biotechnology Ethical Issues Flares Up Anew," EUROPEAN INSIGHT, Jan. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRENT File.
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ness. 162 Through their success in stimulating a dialogue on the
patentability of living matter, opponents have earned the clout
to impose numerous amendments on the Draft Directive and
have successfully prolonged its ratification for over four years.
The most recent success occurred this past Spring when
opposition groups again delayed the ratification process with
the introduction of several proposed amendments during an
April Parliamentary session. 163 The changes demanded include: (1) an absolute prohibition on patents of human materials, (2) greater animal rights protections, and (3) a limited
farmer's exemption from the patent laws. Discussion of these
proposed changes, which experts agree could radically alter
the Draft Directive, will follow.
B. The Struggle to Pass the Draft Directive
1. Forces Shaping the Debate
There are three primary forces competing for public support in the debate over the Draft Directive on biotechnology
patents. These groups are: (1) the "Greens," which is used
generically to refer to all persons harboring moral or ethical
objections to the patenting of living matter, a large majority of
whom are self-proclaimed environmentalists, (2) family farmers, and (3) the various biotech trade associations.
The Greens evoke images of Nazi-like experimentation,
animal suffering, irreversible changes in the human gene pool
and devastating effects of inadvertently introducing a pathogen into the environment in effort to win public support
through fear of the unknown. 64 Most Greens are not per se
opposed to biotech research, but desire strict planning controls imposed upon researchers to avert potential disaster.
Their concerns are shared by many people, including Vice
President of the United States Al Gore, who drew this analogy
in a 1987 law review article, "[i]f we had taken more time to
comprehend the implications of nuclear technology when it
162. "EC Under Pressure to Address Concern on Biotechnology," FOOD AND
May 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRENT File.
163. EC Patent Directive Moves Ahead?, BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, May 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
164. "EC Under Pressure to Address Concern on Biotechnology," FOOD AND
DRINK DAILY, May 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRENT File.
DRINK DAILY,
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was created, we might have developed a keener appreciation
for those choices before us.' 6 5 Through the volatile combination of powerful imagery and a genuine concern, the Greensled opposition has become a formidable power in EC politics,
especially within the European Parliament.
The second major opposition power resides with the family farmers' lobby which, similar to its American cousins, is a
sacrosanct lot evoking a strong sense of paternalism among the
non-farming citizenry. The genetic revolution promises agriculture dramatic increases in the yield of crops and livestock.
For example, several biotech companies are presently working
on "bovine somatotrophin," a genetic enhancement which enables a dairy cow to produce 25% more milk than an unaltered
animal. Such innovations occur despite the United States having spent $1.8 billion on dairy buy-back subsidies in 1986 to
cut dairy supplies by only 8.7%.166
Ag-biotech burns the family farmer's candle at both ends.
First, the high start-up costs, stemming from the purchase of
expensive technologies, preclude the family farmer who is incapable of reaping the scale economies necessary to afford bioag. Second, as illustrated above, enhanced production due to
biotech will saturate the markets, driving prices down and
profit margins even thinner than they already are. Extinction of
the venerable family farmers of Europe and the United States
at the hands of agri-business conglomerates presents an appealing victim behind which the public can rally.
Trade associations of biotech producers have only recently mobilized their resources to counter the swelling tide of
opposition. The most influential body appears to be the European Secretariat of the National BioIndustry Associations
("ESNBA") formed in 1992, composed of the national biotechnology associations from seven of Europe's most active research nations. 6 7 The purported purpose of the ESNBA is as
a collator and disseminator of information on biotech-related
issues and as a contributor to the development of EC regula165. Gore, supra note 19, at 967.
166. Whaite & Jones, supra note 1, at 152.
167. "Europeans Form New Biotechnology Organization," 12 GENETIC TECH.
NEWS, No. 2 at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. The membership
represents the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. Id.
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tory policy.' 68 Its ultimate goal would be the passage of a directive as close to that originally proposed by the Commission
as is politically expedient, though none believe such an expansive doctrine will be the result. One should expect this coordination of resources, however, to prove extremely powerful in
the ensuing debates regarding the draft directive.
2. Significant Amendments Sought
Having introduced the parties seeking to influence the ultimate outcome of the Draft Directive, attention will now focus
on the most significant changes presently being sought. The
most controversial amendments concern the European Parliament's desire to curtail the liberal treatment of living subject
matter contemplated by the Draft Directive. Principal advocates.for the proposed amendments are the Green Party Members and. Social Democrats in the European Parliament, while
the ESNBA and other biotech interests are pressuring the European Commission to hold tough against change and salvage
the Directive with minimal alterations.
The fate of the Draft Directive is within the dominion of
the polarized European Parliament and European Commission, which must forge a compromise. The major changes
sought include: (1) an absolute prohibition on patents of
human materials, (2) greater animal rights protections, and (3)
a limited farmers' exemption from the patent laws.' 69 These
will be discussed in the order introduced above.
a. Human Body Unpatentable
The European Parliament has, since the Draft Directive's
introduction, relentlessly pursued the European Commission
on the issue of patentability of the human body. Their demands were simple: an outright ban on patents that encompassed the human body. Indeed, the amended text of the draft
directive submitted by the European Commission on October
20 of 1992 incorporated these demands, rendering unpatentable: "the human body or parts of the human body per se...
processes for modifying the genetic identity of the human
168. Id.
169. European ParliamentDemands Key Changes in Biotech Patent Legislation, PHARMACEUrICAL Bus. NEWS,'Apr. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
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body for a non-therapeutic purpose which is contrary to the
dignity of man."'17 0 The first phrase states that the human
body is not patentable under any circumstances, which raises
several interesting issues regarding the patent applications for
genetic sequences currently pending before the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office. The subsequent language recognizes
that processes for modifying genetic identity are patentable in
certain instances, while implying by omission that the modified
genetic material is itself unpatentable. Further issues that will
require future interpretation include a "non-therapeutic purpose" and the concept of "contrary to the dignity of man."
The recent amendments to the Draft Directive raise many
issues encompassring the attempt of the United State's National
Institute of Health ("NIH") to patent more than 2,000 fragments of. human genetic sequences.17 ' The NIH's Human
Genome Project, which receives over $3 billion in funding
from the U.S. Government, 72 is intent on identifying all
50,000 to 100,000 human genes and deciphering their contribution to the composition of the human being. 7 3 The information contained within these genes is considered a treasure
trove of knowledge that will reveal the biotech supermedicines of the future. Through patenting this material the
U.S. hopes to develop a new infrastructure in biotechnology,
reserving the exclusive rights to benefit from its findings.
The patenting efforts of the. NIH have drawn a storm of
criticism from those opposed to patenting the human body,
the international science community and the NIH's own project directors. 174 To date, no patents have been issued, nor
have the issues encompassing the "utility"' 175 of such a patent,
170. Biotechnology: Debate on Ethical Issues Flares Up Anew, EUR. ENV'T, Jan. 19,
1993, available in LEXIS, .Nexis Library, OMNI File.
171. John Carey, This Genetic Map Will Lead to a Pot of Gold, Bus. WK., Mar: 2,
1992 at 74.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See "EC Under Pressure to Address Concern on Biotechnology," FoOD AND
DRINK DAILY, May 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRENT File.
Though NIH scientists have identified various sequences, they have made no representations as to the "utility" of any of the gene sequences. Similar to the European
Patent Convention requirement for an industrial application of the patent technology, the "utility" element requires the patent applicant to demonstrate the usefulness of the patent. Id.
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its "obviousness" 176 or the thirteenth amendment implications17 7 of patenting human beings been addressed. The U.S.
Congress has, for the moment, preempted this field with hearings scheduled for the 103rd Congress. 178 In addition, several
international efforts, such as the Rio Summit, which occurred
during the summer of 1992,179 have been launched in an attempt to reach a global resolution of these and other issues
encompassing biotechnology and life patents.
In the interim, several European biotech concerns have retaliated by filing patent applications with the EPC to insure
protections for those gene sequences that they have discovered. 1 0 The common belief among commentators on this issue is that the EPC will not grant patents on gene sequences
because of lack of an industrial application and/or because of
an affront to the "ordre public.''
In light of the language
contained in the recent amendments to the Draft Directive it is
even less likely that the EPC will move swiftly on these applications.
b. Assurances for Protection of Animal Rights
Environmentalists and animal rights groups are the backbone of the effort to include in the Draft Directive language
that denies legal protections for biotech inventions that pertain
to animals. These "Greens," as they have been dubbed by the
media, reject the notion of "life patents," contending that
higher life forms should not be subject to exclusive ownership.
176. A logical extension of the "products of nature" doctrine, which denies patentability of things already existing in nature, could be made to deny patents concerning the human body or its components which are naturally occurring. In Funk
Brothers, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a patent where the scientists were perceived as doing little more than discovering the handiwork of nature. Funk Brothers
Seed Co. v. Kalo Innoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). However, the precedential
value of Funk Bros. is in limited in light of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980).
177. Hecht, supra note 36 at 1023, n.I.
178. Pressurefor Consensus at US Congress Hearing, BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, May 22,

1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
179. Rio Ambush for EC Patents, BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, June 19, 1992, available in

LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
180. "Gene Patenting Debate Continues," BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, May 8, 1992,
available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, CURRENT File.
181. Gene PatentingDebate Continues, BIOTECH. Bus. NEws, May 8, 1992, available

in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
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Their objections hint of the exploitation of which would be
contrary to the "ordre public" and morality limitations found
in Article 53 of the EPC. Indeed, the Green coalition within
the European Parliament has made significant progress toward
its demands for a ban on certain animal patents reflective of
EPC Article 53.82
The specific amendment achieved by European Parliament members makes ineligible for patent "processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to inflict
suffering or physical handicaps upon them without any benefit

to man.'1 3 EC experts believe that this amendment is intended to create a balancing test similar to that used by the
European Patent Office in granting the patent to the Harvard
MouselS4-a test interpreted as a simple balancing of the detriment of animal suffering against the benefit of the innovative
Although this amendment repretechnology to humanity.'
sents a good faith effort by the European Commission to arrive
at a compromise, it is doubtful that the Green coalition in the
European Parliament will be satisfied with the balancing approach which they have already reacted against in the EPC's
Harvard Mouse patent.
Regardless of the form or content of animal rights protections incorporated into the Draft Directive, one thing is certain: it will be the incessant weapon utilized by groups opposing "life patents," as it would seem to grant automatic standing. The Green faction is a stalwart for the cause of inhibiting
the rapid developments in life patenting, and the group's performance in the EPC hearings on the Harvard Mouse patent
has demonstrated their resolve. 8 6 Biotech companies can expect the Greens to remain a contentious source of resistance to
"life patents," challenging the industry's progress at every
step.
182. EC PatentDirective Moves Ahead?, BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, May 8, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
183. Biotechnology: Debate on Ethical Issues Flares Up Anew, EUR. ENV'T, Jan. 19,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Rio Ambush for EC Patents, BIOTECH. Bus. NEWS, June 19, 1992, available in
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c. The Farmers' Exception
Industry reports estimate that agricultural-biotech products generated $200 million in worldwide revenues for
1991,' despite the industry's relative infancy. The agricultural world is not far away from being compelled to compensate biotech firms handsomely when they succeed at genetically engineering the sturdier and better tasting tomatoes,
higher yielding dairy cows, and insect resistant wheat crops,
unless international patent laws evolve to reflect the position
taken by many members in the European Parliament.
. European Parliament members have succeeded at carving
out another exception in the proposed biotech patent directive
that creates a "farmers' privilege." This privilege exempts
farmers from having to pay royalties for the use of seeds from
genetically modified plants or for the breeding of farm animals
in order to renew their stock. 8 8 Farmers are prohibited from
selling protected property such as the seed or breeding of an
animal for income, though the developer of the technology is
still largely deprived of their property interests. This move
represents a radical departure from the EPC's, which does not
recognize an exception for farmers from patent enforcement.
Though the European Commission has again come forward with an olive branch in an effort to ratify the biotech directive, it has been cautious to preserve the competitiveness of
Europe's biotech industry. The amendment permits farmers
to resow their crops with patented technology in perpetuity
without having to make additional payments to the patent
holder. Farmers, however, must acquire the original rights to
patented crops at some point. Therefore, the holder of such
patented technology can simply adjust its pricing policy to extract the full value of using the technology in perpetuity.
Furthermore, one may expect that as biotechnology investment and research increase, product life cycles will decline.
Thus, rights in a given crop or livestock will likely diminish
fleetingly as new and improved genetically engineered products are introduced. This high rate of technology turnover
substantially undermines the right to use an agricultural patent
in perpetuity. Therefore, though the European Commission
187. Hamilton, supra note 16, at 72.
188. EC Patent Directive Moves Ahead?, supra note 182.
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has made a concession to the European Parliament, the terms
of the amendment are not significantly threatening to the bioag industry.
IV. CONCLUSION. A CALL TO ACTION
Our conclusion should begin by again commending the
European peoples for dutifully accepting their role in shaping
the Draft Directive on biotech patents through vigorous public
debate. Europeans have taken the initiative to think through
the implications of granting life patents, an obligation all but
abandoned by citizens in the U.S. and other countries that
hastily enacted liberal biotech patent protections. However,
five years of contentious deliberations have rendered the EC in
a now desperate situation to enact some form of legislation to
adequately protect its biotech industry.
While the United States pursues its policy of patenting
"anything under the sun that is made by man" European biotech concerns are able to patent nothing under their own
Community laws, and are limited to the narrow and uncertain
opportunities provided by the European Patent Convention
(EPC). With every passing day, Europe concedes ground to
the U.S. and Japan, who are rushing ahead into this "industry
of the future" to stake their claim to the $50 billion prize. The
time has now come for the governing bodies of the European
Community to expedite the ratification process for the Draft
Directive on biotechnologiesas a top priority.
The European Commission has come forth with a series of
significant amendments tailored to meet the demands of the
European Parliament, and although they likely fall short of all
that the European Parliament desired, the amendments represent a good faith compromise. Now the European Parliament
must determine whether the Commission has gone far enough
or, in the alternative, whether they are flexible enough to meet
the Commission somewhere in the middle. Should the European Parliament hold steadfast and refuse to compromise, the
Commission will face a difficult decision: whether to pursue an
emasculated directive that overrides the EPC, or to scrap the
Directive in hopes that the EPC can further develop and adequately protect biotech patents.
The European Parliament must likewise be aware of this
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potential. While the Draft Directive hung in limbo over the
past five years, Ireland, Denmark, and Portugal joined the
EPC, such that every Community Member State is now also a
signatory to the EPC. For the European Parliament the implications are clear: if it maintains support for the directive any
longer, the Commission may drop the Directive in preference
to the potentially greater protection afforded by the EPC. Indeed, the EPC has recently granted a patent for the Harvard
Mouse, which it determined using the same straight balancing
test incorporated into the Commission's proposed amendments, and in addition the EPC lacks a farmers' privilege. Perhaps the best tactic for the European Parliament and its Green
backers would be to accept this compromise EC Draft Directive
over which they may influence the enactment of amendments
at some future date, rather than risk the empowerment of the
EPC.
Clearly, both the Greens, whose interests are represented
by the European Parliament, and the biotech industry, championed by the European Commission, must recognize what each
other stands to lose if this debate is protracted any longer.
The present environment of uncertainty coupled with the risks
represented by failure should prove conducive to consensus
building among the various governing bodies of the European
Community. An expedient compromise is in the best interest
of both the Greens and the biotech industry and one should
suspect that the European Parliament will treat favorably the
October 20, 1992 amendments submitted by the Commission.

